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Examining the Examiner: Waiver of the Attorney-
Client Privilege and the Outer Limits of an
Examiner's Powers in Bankruptcy
Jeffery A. Deller, Esq.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the role of examiners in Chapter 11 bankruptcies
was relatively minor. The wave of accounting scandals, corporate
misconduct, and the resulting Chapter 11 bankruptcies of Enron
and WorldCom in recent years have made the appointment of an
examiner in contentious bankruptcies the flavor of the day.2
Against this backdrop, this article discusses the traditional role of
an examiner in bankruptcy proceedings, as well as the current
state of an examiner's duties in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.' To-
wards this end, the role of a bankruptcy trustee will be examined
and contrasted with the duties of an examiner. This article will
discuss how the differences between the powers and duties of a
trustee and those of an examiner can become blurred in complex
1. Mr. Deller is a shareholder in the Pittsburgh law firm of Klett Rooney Lieber &
Schorling, P.C., and he is the Vice Chair of the American Bar Association's Business Bank-
ruptcy Sub-Committee on Trustees and Examiners. Mr. Deller's practice includes repre-
senting debtors and creditors in insolvency related matters, such as out-of-court restructur-
ings and bankruptcy litigation. The author is grateful to the insightful comments provided
by attorneys Michael Rhodes and Sam Toney during the process of writing this article.
2. Loomis, Court-Approved Examiners Become More Common as Scandal Taints
Chapter 11, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 15, 2002.
3. There are two general forms of bankruptcy proceedings. The first general form is
liquidation bankruptcy or straight bankruptcy, whose statutory origins are Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701- 766 (2004). In a typical Chapter 7 liquidation, a
bankruptcy trustee is appointed to collect and liquidate all non-exempt property for the
benefit of creditors. The second general form of bankruptcy proceedings are rehabilitative
bankruptcies -- also known as reorganizations or restructurings. The rehabilitation bank-
ruptcy provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are found at Chapters 9, 11, 12, and 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946; 1101-1174; 1201-1231; 1301-1330 (2004).
Professor David Epstein has described "rehabilitation" bankruptcy as bankruptcy cases
wherein "creditors look to future earnings of the debtor . . . to satisfy their claims. The
debtor generally retains its assets and makes payments to creditors, usually from postpeti-
tion earnings, pursuant to a court-approved plan." See Epstein et al, Bankruptcy at § 1-5
(West 1993). Rehabilitation cases under Chapter 9 are for municipalities. Rehabilitation
cases under Chapters 12 and 13 are for farmers and individual consumer debtors with
regular income, respectively. Chapter 11 is rehabilitation or reorganization for corpora-
tions and, in some instances, for individuals who are not eligible for any meaningful Chap-
ter 12 or 13 relief.
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reorganization cases. This article will explore this issue in the
context of whether an examiner has the power to waive the attor-
ney-client privilege of a debtor in bankruptcy. As this paper dem-
onstrates, the powers of bankruptcy examiners are often illusory.
II. POWERS AND DUTIES OF TRUSTEES AND EXAMINERS
It is widely recognized that the appointment of a trustee or ex-
aminer in a Chapter 11' bankruptcy is an extremely rare event.5
The reason behind this rarity is that in a Chapter 11 environment,
there is a strong presumption that the debtor should remain in
possession of its assets.' Consistent with this presumption, clear
and convincing evidence of "cause" for any such appointment must
be demonstrated before a trustee or examiner can be appointed by
4. Unlike Chapter 11, a trustee is appointed automatically under Chapter 7 of the
Bankruptcy Code to wind-up and liquidate the affairs of the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 701 and
702. The governmental entity that has oversight for trustees appointed in bankruptcy
(both in Chapter 11 and Chapter 7) is the United States Department of Justice through the
office of the United States Trustee. Pursuant to Section 701 of the Bankruptcy Code,
"Promptly after the order for relief under [Chapter 7], the United States Trustee shall
appoint one disinterested person... as interim trustee." See 11 U.S.C. § 701(a). The Bank-
ruptcy Code further provides that the interim trustee may become trustee if either (a) the
interim trustee is duly elected by unsecured creditors holding at least 20 percent of al-
lowed, undisputed, fixed, liquidated unsecured claims, or (b) no other trustee is elected by
the creditors at the meeting of creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 702.
5. In re Cardinal Industries, Inc., 109 B.R. 755 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990). Prior to the
adoption of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, the appointment of a trustee was more routine in
reorganization cases. In fact, the precurser to the Bankruptcy Code, known as the Bank-
ruptcy Act or Chandler Act, expressly contemplated the appointment of a bankruptcy trus-
tee in some instances. For example, under the Bankruptcy Act, corporate debtors desirous
of reorganizing their affairs could file for protection under Chapters X or XI of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 'Under Chapter X of the prior Bankruptcy Act, the bankruptcy court was re-
quired to appoint one or more trustees upon approval of a Chapter X petition if the liqui-
dated, non-contingent debts in the case exceeded $250,000 or more." See LAWRENCE P. KING
ET AL., COLLIER ON BANERUPTCY at I 1104.LHE1][a] (1U ' ed. 2004) thereinafter KING]. If
the corporation's debts were less than $250,000, the court had the discretion to either ap-
point one or more trustees or to continue the debtor in possession. Id. Under Chapter XI of
the Bankruptcy Act, the court was permitted to appoint a trustee for cause shown. Id.
However, as Chapter XI relief did not sufficiently enable corporate debtors to restructure
secured debt or significantly impair the interests of equity holders, Chapter XI of the Bank-
ruptcy Act was often an unworkable solution to large corporate debtors. Id. Moreover, as
Chapter X3s mandatory trustee provisions were equally unappealing, corporate debtors
found themselves reluctant to commence a case under Chapter X. Id. To avoid the buga-
boo associated with the trustee provisions of Chapter X, and the limitations imposed on
large corporate debtors in Chapter XI, Congress re-wrote the rehabilitative provisions of
bankruptcy when it adopted the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at l104.LH[1][b]-[e]. For an out-
standing history of bankruptcy law in the United States, see DAVID A. SKEEL, DEBT'S
DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (Princeton University Press 2001).
6. Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robbins Co., Inc , 828 F.2d 239 (4th
Cir. 1987); In the Matter of Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., 69 F.3d 746 (5th Cir.
1995), rehearing granted and result reversed, 74 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 1996).
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the court. Absent a strong showing that the appointment of a
trustee or examiner is both warranted and in the best interest of
creditors, courts will permit a debtor in Chapter 11 to remain "in
possession" of its assets and business operations.'
In reorganization cases, the general presumption is that allow-
ing the debtor's current management to retain control of the cor-
poration makes a Chapter 11 reorganization more attractive to
debtors than a Chapter 7 liquidation.9 As a result, the rationale
goes, recovery for creditors is maximized and preservation of jobs
is enhanced due to the fact that the Chapter 11 debtor does not
have to waste resources responding to turnover in management.
10
In addition, examiners provide an awesome vehicle for investi-
gating legal and equitable claims and causes of action that may
exist against various third-parties." Unlike a Chapter 11 trustee,
however, examiners traditionally do not take over the day-to-day
control of a business enterprise; rather, such activities are usually
left to the business' personnel, who are running the debtor-in-
possession's operations.12 Consequently, the appointment of an
examiner may be a more attractive vehicle in some Chapter 11
contexts as there is little, if any, business interruption occasioned
by the appointment of an examiner."
A. Appointment, Powers, and Duties of Chapter 11 Trustees
Ordinarily, when a debtor files a Chapter 11 bankruptcy it be-
comes a "debtor-in-possession," and the current officers, directors,
and managers of the debtor remain in place." These officers, di-
rectors, and managers generally are not displaced as a result of a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing and continue to operate the business
of the debtor, subject to fiduciary duties imposed by applicable
7. In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1226 (3d Cir. 1989).
8. See e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
9. See KING, supra note 5 at 1104.02[1].
10. Id.
11. See In re Big Rivers Electric Corp., 284 B.R. 580, 585 (W.D. Ky. 2002) (highlighting
examiner's broad investigatory duties); see also First Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court
Appointed Examiner, In re Enron Corp., NO. 01-16034 at 1-5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (Sept. 21,
2001) (summarizing investigative duties of the Enron examiner).
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b), which omits from an examiner's duties the duty to possess
the debtor's assets or operate its business.
13. See KING, supra note 5 at 1104.03[l].
14. See CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985); In re Pease, 195 B.R. 431, 433
(Bankr. D.Neb. 1996) ("Upon the commencement of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, the
debtor becomes a 'debtor in possession' with a fiduciary duty to creditors."); see also 11
U.S.C. § 1107 (describing the rights, powers, and duties of a debtor-in-possession).
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bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law.15 Indeed, the willingness to
leave a Chapter 11 debtor "in possession" of property of the bank-
ruptcy estate is premised on the assumption that officers, direc-
tors, and employees of the debtor can be depended upon to carry
out the fiduciary responsibilities of a trustee." Of course, one im-
portant fiduciary duty'7 omitted from the duties statutorily im-
posed by the Bankruptcy Code upon a debtor-in-possession is the
duty of investigating its own acts, conduct, and affairs. 8 As a re-
sult of this omission, litigation seeking the appointment of a bank-
ruptcy trustee often arises in a context 9 in which creditors con-
15. See supra note 15.
16. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 355.
17. Justice Cardozo wrote that many "forms of conduct permissible in a workday world
for those acting at arms' length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties." Meinhard
v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). According to Justice Cardozo, the concept of "fiduciary
duty" is "something stricter than the morals of the marketplace." Id. To Justice Cardozo,
fiduciary duty is "the punctilio of an honor most sensitive." Id. In a bankruptcy proceeding,
the fiduciary duty of a debtor-in-possession (and trustee) flows primarily to the creditors of
the bankruptcy estate. See John T. Roache, Note, The Fiduciary Obligations of a Debtor in
Possession, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 133, 144 (1993). These duties include the duties of loyalty,
care, and good faith. See Ramesh K.S. Rao et al., Fiduciary Duty a la Lyonais: An Economic
Perspective on Corporate Governance in a Financially Distressed Firm, 22 J. Corp. L. 53, 60-
61 (1996); Richard M. Cieri et al., The Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Financially Troubled
Companies, 3 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 405, 406 (1994). These duties encompass the duty to
conserve assets and to maximize distribution to creditors, United States v. Aldrich, 795
F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1986) and In re Microwave Prods, of Am., 102 B.R. 666, 671 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1989), and to avoid self-dealing and conflicts of interest. See e.g., In re Ben
Franklin Retail Stores, Inc., 225 B.R. 646 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1998), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 2000 WL 28266 (N.D. 111. 2000); In re Bellvue Place Assoc., 171 B.R. 615, 623-24
(Bankr. N.D. 111. 1994). In the Chapter 11 context, when the conduct of the debtor-in-
possession becomes so egregious as to rise to the level of illegal or fraudulent conduct,
courts have held that debtor's counsel must take corrective measures or face losing fees. In
re Smitty's Truck Stop, Inc., 210 B.R. 844 (10th Cir. 1997)(the failure to investigate and
disclose conflicting claims to funds paid to an attorney as a retainer requires disgorgement
of the retainer and denial of fees); In re Wild Horse Enterprises, Inc., 136 B.R. 830 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1991)(debtors attorney is a fiduciary to the estate and has a duty to remind the
debtor of duties under the Bankruptcy Code); FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 744
(9th Cir. 1992)(securities case where court held that attorney has duty to avoid public harm
when it is discovered that client is engaging in fraud), rev'd on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79
(1994); In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993)(lawyers representing debtors-in-
possession are charged with responsibilities of insuring that when the interest of the bank-
ruptcy estate conflicts with the interest of the debtor's principal, that the interest of the
bankruptcy estate prevail).
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2004).
19. Litigation relating to breaches of fiduciary duty can occur outside of a bankruptcy
context as well. As a general proposition, officers and directors of a solvent corporation
have fiduciary duties to stockholders rather than creditors. See e.g., Koehler v. Black River
Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. 715 (1862); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc, 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). However, when a corporation becomes insolvent, or as it-slides into
bankruptcy, the fiduciary duties of the corporation's officers and directors shift from the
stockholders to the creditors. FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1982). As
described by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:
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tend that officers, directors, and employees of a debtor-in-
possession have breached their respective fiduciary duties either
prior or subsequent to a bankruptcy filing.0
In this context, Section 1104(a) of the Bankruptcy Code sets
forth the grounds for appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11
The law by the great weight of authority seems to be settled that when a corporation
becomes insolvent, or in a failing condition, the officers and directors no longer repre-
sent the stockholders, but by the fact of insolvency, become trustees for the creditors,
and that they cannot by transfer of its property or payment of cash, prefer them-
selves or other creditors.
Davis v. Woolf, 147 F.2d 629, 633 (4th Cir. 1945); see also, Alexander et al. v. Hillman, 296
U.S. 222 (1935).
20. See KING supra note 5 at 1104.02[3][b]. Officers and directors of corporations
usually hide behind the "business judgment" defense to claims that they breached their
respective duties. Case law is somewhat mixed as to whether the business judgment de-
fense is viable when officers and directors are looking at breach of duty claims that arise
out of, or relate to, conduct occurring during the administration of a bankruptcy estate. For
example, in one case, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Florida held that a bankruptcy fiduciary did not breach its duty when the complained of
conduct fell within the sound business judgment of the debtor and was made in good faith
and on a reasonable basis. In the Matter of Southern BioTech, Inc., 37 B.R. 318 (Bankr.
N.D. Fla. 1983). Other courts have rejected the sound business judgment rule in the bank-
ruptcy context, and have held bankruptcy fiduciaries to the standard of "reasonable care
and due diligence." For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote in the case of In
re Ridgen:
The dissent voices some reservations and concern about our discussion of the fiduci-
ary duty of the bankruptcy trustee. The dissent maintains that the nature of the
trustee's duty varies depending upon whether he or she is acting on behalf of the in-
dividual debtor or corporate debtor. In the latter case, the dissent maintains that the
trustee's role is in the nature of a corporate manager and that his actions should
therefore be measured by the business judgment rule rather than by the fiduciary
standard of reasonable care and due diligence. To support this contention the dissent
relies on the recent Supreme Court decision in [CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343
(1985)]. The Supreme Court in Weintraub held that the trustee in bankruptcy of a
debtor corporation, rather than the corporation's directors, had the power to waive
the debtor corporation's attorney-client privilege.... Weintraub's holding is limited.
Nowhere does the Supreme Court in Weintraub state that as a general rule the con-
duct of the trustee of a corporate debtor is analyzed under the business judgment
rule. Weintraub does contain some language discussing the nature of the role of the
trustee of a corporate debtor. The Supreme Court, in an effort to support its holding
in that case .... discussed the way in which the trustee plays a role most analogous
to that of a solvent corporation's management. Nonetheless, we do not believe that
Weintraub compels or requires us to reformulate the standard by which we judge the
conduct of a trustee in the context of corporate debtors generally. In the absence of a
clear statement from the Supreme Court that the business judgment rule now applies
whenever analyzing the conduct of a corporate debtor's trustee, we are unwilling to
adopt such a rule .... The majority in this case remains convinced... that the rea-
sonable care and due diligence standard is the one by which we judge the conduct of
the trustee, regardless of whether the debtor is an individual or a corporation.
In re Ridgen, 795 F.2d 727, 731 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit went further in
Ridgen and held that reasonable care and due diligence is exercised appropriately when
"an ordinarily prudent person would exercise [the same degree of care and due diligence] in
similar circumstances." Id. at 730.
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bankruptcy proceeding. Specifically, Sections 1104(a)(1) and (2) of
the Bankruptcy Code authorize the appointment of a trustee for
"cause," and provide as follows:
[O]n request of a party in interest.., the court shall order the
appointment of a trustee:
(1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or
gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current
management, either before or after the commencement of the
case, or similar cause, but not including the number of hold-
ers of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or li-
abilities of the debtor; or
(2) if such appointment is in the interest of creditors, any eq-
uity security holders, and other interests of the estate, with-
out regard to the number of holders of securities or the
amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor.2'
Under this section of the Bankruptcy Code, examples of "cause"
expressly include fraud, dishonesty, and gross mismanagement of
the debtor.22  The examples of "cause" set forth in Section
1104(a)(1), however, do not comprise an exhaustive list.2 For ex-
ample, the existence of a conflict of interest among the debtor's
existing management may constitute "cause" for the appointment
of a trustee.24 The lack of creditor confidence in the debtor's man-
agement may also constitute "cause" for the appointment of a
trustee.25 No matter what "cause" is alleged, where such "cause" is
proven 26 to exist, a court must order the appointment of a trustee
21. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). See also In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d at 1227 and the
cases cited therein.
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 102(3) ("'includes' and 'including' are not limiting"); In re Lilley, 91
F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 1996).
24. See, e.g., In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 191 B.R. 659, 661 (M.D. La. 1995);
affd, 74 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 51 (1996); In re Fiesta Homes of
Georgia, Inc, 125 B.R. 321, 325 (Bankr. S.D.Ga. 1990); In re L.S. Good & Co., 8 B.R. 312,
315 (Bankr. N.D.W.Va. 1980).
25. In re Madison Management Group, Inc., 137 B.R. 275, 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992);
Cardinal Industries, 109 B.R. at 765.
26. With respect to whether the appointment of a trustee is in the best interest of credi-
tors and other parties-in-interest, courts "eschew rigid absoluteness and look to the practi-
cal realities and necessities" of the case. In re Madison Management Group, Inc., 137 B.R.
at 282 (citing In re Hotel Associates, Inc., 3 B.R. 343, 345 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980)). Among
the factors considered are (i) the trustworthiness related to the management of the debtor,
and (ii) the benefits derived by the appointment of a trustee, balanced against the cost of
appointment. In re Madison Management Group, Inc., 137 B.R. at 282 (citations omitted).
192 Vol. 43
Winter 2005 Examining the Examiner
if the appointment is in the best interest of creditors and other
parties-in-interest in the case. 7
Once appointed, the powers and duties of a Chapter 11 trustee
are quite vast,2s as a trustee assumes the same fiduciary duties to
creditors as a debtor-in-possession,
29 plus some additional ones.
30
The additional duties assumed by a bankruptcy trustee include
the duty to "investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and
financial condition of the debtor."31
Upon the appointment of a trustee,2 all property of the debtor
passes to an estate represented by the trustee. 3  Thus the debtor
and its management team are simply no longer in control of the
business operations of the Chapter 11 debtor. 4 Under the Bank-
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a); In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d at 1226; In re Nicolet,
Inc., 80 B.R. 733, 738 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
28. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 352.
29. The debtor-in-possession is accountable for all property received, examines claims
and objects to improper claims, furnishes information regarding the administration of the
estate if such information is requested by interested parties, files monthly operating re-
ports, files monthly operating reports, files tax returns, files a plan of reorganization or
recommends conversion or dismissal of the case if no plan is filed. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704,
1106 and 1107. The debtor in possession also is authorized to operate its business. 11
U.S.C. § 1108.
30. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1106 and 1107.
31. See ll U.S.C. § 1106(3). Another additional duty is the duty to "collect and reduce
to money the property of the estate for which such trustee serves, and to close such estate
as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest." 11 U.S.C. §
704(1). Section 1109 of the Bankruptcy Code appears to define the term "party-in-interest"
as "including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders'
committee, a creditor, and equity security holder, or any indenture trustee." 11 U.S.C. §
1109(b).
32. As in Chapter 7, trustees in Chapter 11 may also be elected by creditors if the court
deems it appropriate to order the appointment of a trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b). The
Bankruptcy Code provides that "on the request of a party in interest made not later than
30 days after the court orders the appointment of a trustee .... the United States trustee
shall convene a meeting of creditors for the purpose of electing one disinterested person to
serve as trustee in the case." Id. For a discussion of who constitutes a "disinterested per-
son" under the Bankruptcy Code, see Kurt F. Gwynne, Employment of Turnaround Man-
agement Companies, "Disinterestedness" Issues Under the Bankruptcy Code, and Issues
Under Delaware General Corporation Law, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 673 (2002).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a).
34. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541, and 1106. It can be argued that the trustee appointment
provisions of Section 1104 of the Bankruptcy Code are by no means the only manner by
which a change of corporate governance of a debtor-in-possession may be properly effectu-
ated in bankruptcy. Under Sections 1107 and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code, a Chapter 11
debtor-in-possession is free to manage its assets and operate its business, subject to general
bankruptcy court oversight. For example, a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession is free to
'enter into such transactions" in the ordinary course of business without first obtaining
prior court approval. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1). Where the debtor desires to enter into
transactions that are outside the ordinary course of business, the debtor-in-possession is
permitted to enter into them after first obtaining court approval upon notice and hearing.
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). Examples of transactions that would require prior court approval
193
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ruptcy Code, the trustee is accountable for all property received
and has the duty to maximize the value of the estate."5 The trus-
tee, therefore, is not only directed to investigate the debtor's fi-
nancial affairs, but he or she also is empowered to sue officers,
directors, and other third-parties to recover, on behalf of the es-
tate, fraudulent or preferential transfers of the debtor's property.36
Without the necessity of bankruptcy court approval, a Chapter 11
trustee is also empowered to operate the debtor's business and
sell, use, and lease property of the bankruptcy estate in the ordi-
nary course37 of business. 3
include a debtor-in-possession's retention, payment, or replacement of non-ordinary course
professionals. See In re Pannebaker Custom Cabinet Corp., 198 B.R. 453 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1996); In re Bartley Lindsay Co., 137 B.R. 305, 309 (D. Minn. 1991); see also 11 U.S.C. §§
327(a) and (b). Some courts have utilized Sections 327, 363, 1107, and 1108 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to authorize the appointment of a "responsible officer" or "person in control" of
a Chapter 11 debtor's assets and operations. See In the Matter of FSC Corp., 38 B.R. 346,
349 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983); accord In re Harper Industries, Inc., 18 B.R. 773, 775 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982). For example, in FSC Corp., the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania upheld the appointment of a responsible officer to per-
form the duties of a debtor-in-possession when all of the debtor's officers and directors had
resigned, thereby leaving the debtor with no management. While the lack of a board of
directors could have been cause for the appointment of a trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 1104,
the bankruptcy court in FSC nevertheless upheld the appointment of a responsible officer
because (a) the parties who had a financial stake in the outcome of the case consented to
the appointment and (b) Sections 226 and 303 of Delaware Corporation Law authorized a
court of competent jurisdiction to appoint a custodian or "other representative" to act for
the corporation's board of directors. See FSC Corp., 38 B.R. at 349-51; see also In re Gas-
light Club, Inc., 782 F.2d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 1986)(replacement person in control authorized
where creditors with financial stake consented and nothing under applicable state law
precluded the replacement of management); In re Boileau, 736 F.2d 503, 505-06 (9th Cir.
1984)(same); In re Harper Industries, Inc., 18 B.R. at 775 (same); In re Freedlander, Inc.,
86 B.R. 66, 68 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988)(substitution of management is permissible where
there is a consensus that management should be replaced).
35. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(1), 704(2) and 1106(a)(1); In re Washington Group, Inc., 476
F.Supp. 246, 250 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
36. Id.
37. The phrase "ordinary course of business" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code.
Many courts have applied a two-part test to determine whether a transaction is in the
ordinary course of business. First, in the "vertical dimension" or "creditor expectation" test,
the court analyzes the transaction from the vantage point of a hypothetical creditor and
inquires whether the transaction subjects a creditor to economic risks of a nature different
from those the creditor accepted when it initially contracted with the debtor. Second, the
"horizontal dimension" test determines whether, from an industry-wide perspective, the
transaction is of the sort commonly undertaken by companies in that industry. For a dis-
cussion of these tests, see In re Roth American, Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 953 (3d Cir. 1992); and
In re Glosser Bros., 124 B.R. 664, 667 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991).
38. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b), 363 (c)(1) and 1106(3). Sections 363(b)(1) and 363(c)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Code provide that a trustee or debtor-in-possession may use, sell or lease
property of the estate without prior court approval only so long as the transaction contem-
plated by the trustee or debtor-in-possession is "in the ordinary course of business." See 11
U.S.C. §§ 363(b)(1) and (c)(1). If the trustee's or debtor's transaction is outside the ordinary
course of business, the transaction may be avoided. See 11 U.S.C. § 549. Thus, where a
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B. Appointment, Powers, and Duties of Examiners
All of the expansive powers reposed in a Chapter 11 trustee,
along with their correlating benefits, do not come without a price.
From a practical perspective, the appointment of a Chapter 11
trustee may cause business operations to be interrupted to some
degree as a result of the installation of new management.39 In ad-
dition, the debtor and Chapter 11 trustee lose one of the funda-
mental protections afforded to Chapter 11 debtors, namely the
exclusive right to propose a plan and solicit support for a plan of
reorganization during the first 120 days of a bankruptcy case.4" As
transaction is ordinary, as opposed to extraordinary, a trustee or debtor-in-possession may
freely enter into the desired transaction without the need of affording interested parties
notice or opportunity for a hearing. The purpose behind such a rule was stated succinctly
by the United States District Court for the Southern District Court in the case of In re
James A. Phillips, Inc., 29 B.R. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Court in the Phillips, Inc. case,
wrote:
[Tihe apparent purpose of requiring notice only where the use of property is extraor-
dinary is to assure interested persons of an opportunity to be heard concerning
transactions different from those that might be expected to take place so long as the
debtor in possession is allowed to continue normal business operations under 11
U.S.C. §§ 1107(a) and 1108. The touchstone of 'ordinariness' is thus the interested
parties' reasonable expectation of what transactions the debtor in possession is likely
to enter in the course of business. So long as the transactions conducted are consis-
tent with these expectations, creditors have no right to notice and hearing, because
their objections to such transactions relate to the bankrupt's chapter 11 status, not
the particular transactions themselves. Where the debtor in possession is merely ex-
ercising the privileges of its chapter 11 status, which include the right to operate the
bankrupt business, there is no general right to notice and hearing concerning par-
ticular transactions.
In re James A. Phillips, Inc., 29 B.R. at 394.
39. For example, the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee may trigger an event of
default under the debtor's post-petition credit facility, which in-turn could impair the
debtor-in-possession's ability to finance its operations in Chapter 11.
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(1). Section 1121 of the Bankruptcy Code augments the
concept of a "debtor-in-possession" and provides for an initial "exclusivity" period of 120
days after the commencement of a Chapter 11 case during which a debtor has the exclusive
right to file a plan of reorganization; if the debtor files a plan within such 120-day period, it
has an additional 60 days thereafter to solicit acceptance of its plan, during which time no
other party may file a plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b), (c). While Section 1121 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code has only a 120 day time limitation, the Bankruptcy Code does afford debtors-
in-possession with flexibility in that the Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizes the court to
extend the exclusivity period for "cause," after notice and hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d).
Whether cause exists to extend the exclusive periods is at the discretion of the court based
upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. See First American Bank of New
York v. Southwest Gloves & Safety Equip., Inc., 64 B.R. 963 (D. Del. 1986). Although the
term "cause" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, the legislative history indicates that it
is intended to be a flexible standard. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595 at 231 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963; In re AMKO Plastics, Inc., 197 B.R. 74, 77 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1996)("[T]he legislative intent . .. [is] to promote maximum flexibility."); In re Clamp-All
Corp., 233 B.R. 198, 207 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999); In re All Seasons, Inc., 121 B.R. 1002,
1004 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990). A flexible standard is necessary "in order to allow the debtor
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a result, once a Chapter 11 trustee is appointed, creditors lacking
fiduciary duties to all creditors may come forward and propose
their own plan and attempt to take control of the reorganization
process.41 Congress recognized these risks, and crafted in Section
1104 of the Bankruptcy Code an alternative to the appointment of
a trustee, wherein something less than a full-fledged trustee is
warranted.42  In these unique circumstances, the vehicle utilized
by Congress in Section 1104 of the Bankruptcy Code is called an
"examiner."
The process for the appointment of an examiner is the same for
the appointment of a trustee," with one notable exception.45 In
to reach an agreement." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95' Cong., 1" Sess. 231-32 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6191. A flexible standard thus provides the debtor with rea-
sonable opportunity to stabilize its business operations at the outset of the case, to negoti-
ate with creditors an effective plan of reorganization, and to prepare the necessary finan-
cial and non-financial information that must be disclosed to creditors. See In re Newark
Airport/Hotel, 156 B.R. 444, 451 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993); In re McLean Indus., 87 B.R. 830,
833-34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). In determining whether to extend a debtor's exclusive
periods, courts assess the totality of circumstances and consider a variety of factors. See,
e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 208 B.R. 661, 664 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Express
One Int'l Inc., 194 B.R. 98, 100 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996); McLean, 87 B.R. at 834. The fol-
lowing factors are relevant to a court's decision to extend a debtor-in-possession's exclusive
periods: whether (a) the debtor's case is sizeable and complex; (b) there is good faith pro-
gress towards rehabilitation and development of a consensual plan of reorganization; (c) the
debtor is not seeking to use its exclusivity to pressure creditors into accepting a plan they
find unacceptable; and (d) the debtor is generally making required post petition payments
as they come due and is effectively managing its business and preserving the value of its
assets. See id. In re Express One, 194 B.R. at 100; In the Matter of Interco, Inc., 137 B.R.
999, 1001 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992). The Bankruptcy Code also contains provisions that protect
creditors from a debtor-in-possession's abuse of the exclusivity afforded to it. Specifically, Section
1121(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that "after notice and a hearing, the court may for cause reduce
or increase the 120-day" exclusivity period. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d). The leading case in this area is the case
of In re Texaco, Inc., 81 B.R. 806 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). In Texaco, the United States Bankruptcy
Court held that the party seeking to reduce or extend the exclusivity period carries the burden of proving
that "cause" exists to do so. One court has even described that burden as being "heavy." See Interco Inc.,
supra. In those cases where the exclusivity period was reduced, factors such as gross mismanagement of
the debtor's operations or acrimonious feuding between the debtor's principals serving as a major obstacle
to a successful reorganization were regarded as "cause" for the reduction of the exclusivity period. See
e.g., In re Texas Extrusion Corp., 68 B.R. 712 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986). Courts have also held that plan
exclusivity provisions should not be employed as a tactical device to put pressure on parties to yield to a
plan the movant considers to be unsatisfactory. Texaco, 81 B.R. at 812. In a reorganization context, it has
been held that the mere fact that a party would like to take part in the plan formulation and negotiation
process is insufficient to constitute "cause" for terminating exclusivity. See in re Eagle-Picher Indus.,
Inc., 176 B.R. 143 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994). It has also been held that "cause" is not shown merely
where the movant desires to file its own plan. Id.
41. See, e.g., In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990), as a text-
book case in which the plan process in bankruptcy was, albeit unsuccessfully, used as a tool
to undertake a hostile takeover of a debtor-in-possession.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c).
43. Id.
44. The process is that a party in interest, or the court on its own motion, must move
for the appointment of an examiner and demonstrate that (a) "cause" exists for the ap-
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looking at the plain language of Section 1104(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code, it appears that Congress intended the automatic appoint-
ment of an examiner in instances where (a) the debtor's obliga-
tions to an insider exceed $5,000,000; and (b) creditors desire the
appointment of an examiner to investigate the conduct, assets,
and liabilities of the debtor. 6
Hence, the frequently asked question is: "Is Section 1104(c)(2)
relief automatic or does the bankruptcy court have some discretion
in fashioning relief?" Courts are split on how Section 1104(c)(2)
operates.7 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, following the ma-
jority rule, concluded that when the statutory requirements of 11
U.S.C. § 1104(c)(2) are met, the court has no discretion and must
order the appointment of an examiner because the statute is clear
on its face.48  The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle
District of Florida, however, reached a different result and con-
cluded that the appointment of an examiner is nonetheless discre-
tionary even if the movant demonstrates that insider claims ex-
ceed $5 million.49
Once appointed, the question often posed by parties-in-interest
to examiners is, "What are your powers and duties?" While the
pointment; and (b) the appointment is in the best interest of creditors and other parties in
interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c).
45. Under the Bankruptcy Act, an examiner could only be appointed in cases where no
bankruptcy trustee was appointed, as Chapter X did not contemplate the appointment of
both a trustee and an examiner. See KING, supra note 5, at I 1104.LH[2][a]; see also
Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminals Bldg. Cor., 118 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1941), for a description
of the use of examiners in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act.
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(2). The term "insider" is defined in Section 101(31) of the
Bankruptcy Code, and such term includes, but is not limited to, any relative of an individ-
ual debtor and any officer, director or person in control of a corporate debtor. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(31).
47. Compare In re Revco D.S., Inc., 898 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1990)(appointment of exam-
iner mandatory where provisions of Section 1104(c)(2) are met); In re Mechem Fin. of Ohio,
Inc., 92 B.R. 760 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988)(same); In re the Bible Speaks, 74 B.R. 511
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); In re 1243 20t' Street, Inc., 6 B.R. 683 (Bankr. D. D.C. 1980)(same);
In re Lenihan, 4 B.R. 209 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1980)(same); with In re Rutenberg, 158 B.R. 230
(M.D. Fla. 1993)(appointment not mandatory even if requirements of Section 1104(c)(2)
met); In re Shelter Res. Corp., 35 B.R. 304 (N.D. Ohio 1983)(same). In any event, even if
the applications of Section 1104(c)(2) are met, a party-in-interest may waive his or her right
to seek the appointment of an examiner by sheer delay in submitting such a request to the
court. In re Bradlees Stores, Inc., 209 B.R. 36, 39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also In re
Schepps Food Stores, Inc. 148 B.R. 27, 30-31 (S.D. Tex. 1992)(holding that creditor waived
right to examiner where request was made just before plan confirmation hearing and would
disrupt proceedings).
48. Revco, 898 F.2d at 500.
49. Rutenberg, 158 B.R. at 233 (although the case in question met the statutory provi-
sions of 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(2), the appointment of an examiner was rejected on the basis
that such appointment would delay the administration of the case).
197
Duquesne Law Review
powers and duties of a Chapter 11 trustee are generally broad, the
powers and duties of an examiner may be subject to some restric-
tions, thereby affording a Chapter 11 debtor some autonomy in its
restructuring.50
The limited operational impact of an examiner in bankruptcy is
consistent with the limited purpose of the appointment of an ex-
aminer in the first instance. In In re Gilman Servs., Inc., the
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts held,
The primary function of an examiner is to investigate the
debtor's actions, financial condition, as is appropriate under
the particular circumstances of the case including any allega-
tions of fraud, dishonesty or gross mismanagement of the
debtor by current or former management....
Even though § 1104 provides for the appointment of an exam-
iner to investigate allegations of fraud, dishonesty, and gross
mismanagement, mere allegations of misconduct will not suf-
fice; there must be a factual basis supporting the need for an
independent investigation.51
The Gilman Court's description of the purpose of an examiner in
bankruptcy is consistent with conclusions reached by other bank-
ruptcy courts throughout the country. For instance, the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio ob-
served in In the Matter of Baldwin United Corp.,
An Examiner's legal status is unlike that of any other court-
appointed officer which comes to mind. He is first and fore-
most disinterested and non adversarial. The benefits of his
investigative efforts flow solely to the debtor and to its credi-
tors and shareholders, but he answers solely to the Court.
[A]n examiner constitutes a Court fiduciary and is amendable
to no other purpose or interested party.52
Similarly, in In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held,
The purpose of an examiner's investigation in bankruptcy is
to discover whatever assets may exist for the estate of the
50. See KING, supra note 5 at 1104.03.
51. 46 B.R. 322, 327 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
52. 46 B.R. 314, 316 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
198 Vol. 43
Winter 2005 Examining the Examiner 199
bankrupt, just as one purpose for the appointment of a trustee
is so that a trustee may use statutory powers conferred by the
Bankruptcy Code to collect all property belonging to the
debtor for the benefit of the debtor's creditors. The bank-
ruptcy code gives a trustee more power than a solvent debtor
to collect property belonging to the estate. Bankruptcy Rule
2004 likewise gives the Examiner scope to investigate which
is broader than that of civil discovery under Rule 26...
The investigation of an examiner in bankruptcy, unlike civil
discovery under Rule 26(c), is supposed to be a 'fishing expedi-
tion,' as exploratory and groping as appears proper to the Ex-
aminer ....
The limited nature" of an examiner's role is highlighted by the
plain language of Section 1106 of the Bankruptcy Code.55 Under
Section 1106(b), and unless the bankruptcy court orders other-
wise, a bankruptcy examiner is a fiduciary charged with the duty
of investigating56 the "acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and finan-
53. 156 B.R. 414, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
54. See In re American Bulk Transp., Inc., 8 B.R. 337, 340 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(setting forth the duties of trustees and examiners).
56. As set forth above, the primary function of an examiner appointed pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 1104(c) is to investigate the debtor's actions, financial condition, and, as is appro-
priate under the particular circumstances of the case, any allegations of fraud, dishonesty,
or gross mismanagement of the debtor. Gilman Servs., Inc., 46 B.R. at 327. An examiner
acts as an independent party to review, without monetary interest, transactions and docu-
ments. An examiner is first and foremost a disinterested party and is nonadversarial. The
benefits of an examiner's investigative efforts therefore flow solely to the debtor and the
debtor's creditors and equity holders. Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. at 316. Once an exam-
iner collects the requisite information, he or she then disseminates the information to the
creditors of the bankruptcy estate in a nonadversarial context by filing a report with the
bankruptcy court. Towards this end, the examiner is:
[A] fact-finder in the colloquial sense of the term. The Examiner discovers facts for
the benefit of the creditors as directed by the Court. He does not, however, issue ju-
dicial "findings of fact" as a court does under F.R.B.P. 7052. It follows then, that
while the Examiner may be appointed by the Court, he is so appointed to assist the
parties other than the Court. He is not an extension of the Court.
In re Apex Oil Co., 101 B.R. 92, 99 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989). The conclusions of an examiner,
therefore, "do not have the binding effect on the Court or parties of those of a special mas-
ter, arbitrator or magistrate." Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 156 B.R at 432 (quoting Baldwin
United Corp., 46 B.R. at 316). Accordingly, because an examiner does not make an "adjudi-
catory determination of substantive rights," an examiner's findings have no binding effect
on the debtor or its creditors in the absence of a bankruptcy court expressly adopting the
examiner's conclusions. As a practical matter, however, a bankruptcy court will probably
give great deference to the conclusions drawn by any examiner that it appoints. FED. R.
EVID. 702 might also apply to permit the introduction of an examiner's report into evidence
as an "expert opinion" to the extent the appropriate legal foundation is made by the party
proffering the evidence.
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cial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's business
and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and any
other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan.""7
While Section 1106(b) generally provides for a limited role of an
examiner in Chapter 11, Section 1106(b) does not contain an abso-
lute express prohibition to the bankruptcy court expanding an ex-
aminer's duties beyond conducting a mere investigation. The
plain language of Section 1106(b) even contemplates that an ex-
aminer appointed by the Court "shall perform... any other duties
of the trustee that the court orders the debtor in possession not to
perform."58 The issue raised by this catch-all provision therefore is
57. See 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b). Because an examiner must also, "as soon as practicable,
file a 'statement of any investigation' and 'transmit a copy or a summary of any such
statement to any creditors' committee or equity security holders' committee,' to any inden-
ture trustee, and to such other entity as the court designates," see 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(4),(as
adopted and incorporated by 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b)), an issue exists as to whether a court-
appointed examiner is protected from discovery by some sort of quasi-immunity. This issue
comes up from time to time, as the investigation that an examiner does in the course of a
bankruptcy proceeding usually uncovers an abundance of information which third party
litigants would like to use to their own benefit. The Enron case is a good example of a situa-
tion wherein various parties-in-interest had litigation claims and contended that the exam-
iner possessed documents and information relevant to the prosecution or defense of such
actions. The examiner in Enron, however, obtained limited immunity from third-party
discovery before any discovery was propounded upon the examiner in that case. Why?
There are compelling interests in allowing an examiner to be immune from discovery in
connection with his or her work. From a practical perspective, finding individuals to work
as examiners in complex cases like Enron might become increasingly difficult if the exam-
iner would be subject to a barrage of discovery requests at the conclusion of the examiner's
tenure. Essentially, no one would want to be placed in involuntary servitude to the bank-
ruptcy estate. Providing an examiner with limited immunity from discovery is consistent
with the notion that an examiner is a disinterested third party and an officer of the court.
Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 213 B.R. at 977 (recognizing that an examiner is an independent
third party and an officer of the court); Interco Inc., 127 B.R. at 638 (the examiner's role is
by its nature disinterested and non-adversarial). Third party litigants and those involved
in the underlying bankruptcy, however, do have compelling arguments for requesting in-
formation from the examiner to be used in subsequent litigation. In fact, such parties' due
process rights are paramount to an examiner's convenience so long as the examiner suffers
no undue harm or burden for its efforts in responding to discovery requests. Accordingly,
access to the examiner's documents and information appears to be appropriate when the
proponent of discovery has no other available means of obtaining relevant documents and
information from other known sources. This conclusion appears to be consistent with the
traditional view that an examiner is independent and should not be used by third party
litigants to fuel their litigation. Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. at 316.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b). Section 1106(a)(3) and (a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code requires
the trustee to "investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the
debtor, the operation of the debtor's business, the desirability of the continuance of such
business, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan." The
"other duties" referred in Section 1106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code include the duty to ac-
count for estate property, 11 U.S.C. § 704(2); the duty to examine and object to claims, 11
U.S.C. § 704(5); the duty to furnish information to parties-in-interest, 11 U.S.C. § 704(7);
the duty to file financial reports and tax returns, 11 U.S.C. § 704(8); the duty to make a
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whether an examiner may be morphed into a quasi-trustee, with-
out implicating some of the adverse consequences triggered by the
appointment of a trustee. The answer to this question is some-
what mixed.
From the outset, it should be recognized that an examiner's du-
ties cannot be morphed if a bankruptcy trustee has been ap-
pointed. Section 1104(b) of the Bankruptcy Code appears to con-
template that an examiner cannot be appointed if a trustee is al-
ready in place.59 This "don't tread on me" approach is consistent
with the prudential concern of not limiting a trustee's powers and
duties, as the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee under the
Bankruptcy Code completely ousts the debtor's officers and direc-
tors.6 °
The expansion of an examiner's duties under the Bankruptcy
Code is not to be inferred or taken lightly. Expansion of an exam-
iner's duties may be accomplished only by an express order of the
bankruptcy court, and such order must plainly set forth both the
duties that the examiner is to perform and the duties that the
debtor is to abstain from performing.61
In instances where an examiner's duties have been expanded,
the majority of the case law appears to indicate that the inflation
of the duty balloon occurs in the context of liquidating assets of
the bankruptcy estate, including pursuing causes of action identi-
fied in an examiner's report and soliciting bids for the sale of as-
sets under circumstances wherein the debtor did not aggressively
pursue the liquidation of such asserts." Alternatively, courts have
also cloaked examiners with the duty of facilitating the plan con-
firmation process in instances where the reorganization process
final report with respect to the administration of the estate, 11 U.S.C. § 704(9); the duty to
file schedules of assets and liabilities and statements of financial affairs, 11 U.S.C.
1106(a)(2); the duty to file a plan or recommend conversion or dismissal of the case, 11
U.S.C. § 1106(a)(5); the duty to furnish information to governmental taxing bodies, 11
U.S.C. § 1106(a)(6); and the duty to file post-confirmation reports, 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(7).
59. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(providing that the appointment of an examiner can only
occur where cause is shown and where "the court does not order the appointment of a trus-
tee").
60. See KING, supra note 5 at 1106.05[1](noting that Section 1106(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code should "not be viewed as a means by which the court can essentially remove
the debtor in possession from control of the estate without appointing a trustee").
61. See 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b).
62. In re Patton's Busy Bee Disposal Serv., Inc., 182 B.R. 681 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995);
see also In re John Peterson Motors, Inc., 47 B.R. 551 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); In re Carne-
gie Int'l Corp., 51 B.R. 252 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1984).
Winter 2005
Duquesne Law Review
has broken down."3 By way of illustration, the court in In re Public
Serv. Co. of New Hampshire appointed an examiner to mediate
and break a deadlock in plan negotiations and to assist the court
at disclosure statement hearings relating to competing plans.'
III. THE EXAMINER AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The ability of a court to grant an examiner quasi-trustee powers
and duties under Section 1106 of the Bankruptcy Code has al-
lowed courts to expand the scope of an examiner's role in Chapter
11 beyond that of a mere investigator in order to meet the individ-
ual needs of each case.65 The ability to inflate the role of an exam-
iner appears to have practical utility in the bankruptcy context,
particularly due to the fact that Chapter 11 cases have grown in
size, complexity, and volume.6 The growing number of accounting
scandals and cases of executive misconduct will lead to examiners
continuing to play a pivotal role in complex Chapter 11 cases. 7
However, an examiner's inflated power and duty balloon may be
popped in certain circumstances.' The outer-limits of an exam-
iner's powers and duties can be illustrated through an examina-
tion of whether the examiner has the power to waive a debtor's
attorney-client privilege. Perhaps one of the most publicized
Chapter 11 cases involving the scope of an examiner is In re Enron
Corporation,69 in which the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York authorized the appointment of
63. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 279 B.R. 671, 678-82 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)(examiner's
role expanded to facilitate reorganization plan); In re Keene Corp., 205 B.R 690, 694
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)(examiner appointed with power to mediate and supervise reorgani-
zation negotiations); In re UNR Indus., 72 B.R. 789, 795-96 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1987)(examiner appointed to mediate and facilitate impasses in negotiating a reorganiza-
tion plan).
64. 99 B.R. 177, 182-83 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1989); see also In re Great Barrington Fair &
Amusement, Inc., 53 B.R. 241, 244 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
65. See, e.g., Enron Corp., 279 B.R. at 678-82 (appointing examiner with expanded
powers to facilitate plan of reorganization); Apex Oil Co., 111 B.R. at 240 (examiner ap-
pointed with expanded power to resolve claims); Williamson v. Roppollo, 114 B.R. 127
(W.D. La. 1990)(examiner with expanded powers to pursue avoidance actions); In re World
Indus. Ctrs., Ltd., 992 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1993)(unpublished decision)(examiner appointed
with expanded power to sell estate property); Balser v. Dep't of Justice, 327 F.3d 903, 905-
06 (9th Cir. 2003)(examiner appointed with expanded power to manage rental properties
and sell assets).
66. Kaplan, The Role of the Examiner: Some Observations, 4 BANKR. DEV. J. 439 (1987).
67. See Loomis, supra note 2.
68. In re Int'l Distrib. Ctrs, Inc., 74 B.R. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)(rejecting powerful exam-
iner as a "pseudo-trustee").
69. No. 01-16034, 2002 WL 32151530 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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an examiner to investigate various questionable balance sheet
transactions between the debtor and its affiliates."0 The order ap-
pointing an examiner in Enron (hereinafter "the Enron Order")
was fairly broad in terms of the investigative duties reposed in the
examiner appointed in that case." To facilitate the examiner's
investigation, and to aid the examiner in uncovering claims and
causes of action against various parties (including, without limita-
tion, the debtor's present and former officers, attorneys, and ac-
countants), the Enron Order also went so far as to grant the exam-
iner the power to waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege. 2
The power granted in the Enron Order that permitted the exam-
iner to exercise control over and to waive the attorney-client privi-
lege is controversial and raises many questions, including: "Does
an examiner have an interest in the attorney-client privilege in
order to waive it?"
There is no specific provision in the Bankruptcy Code that
grants an examiner an interest in the debtor's privileges, let alone
conferring upon an examiner the ability to waive those privileges.
Indeed, examiners are not even mentioned as being parties-in-
interest under the Bankruptcy Code."
Proponents of granting an examiner the power to waive the
debtor's privileges point to Section 1106(b) of the Bankruptcy Code
as a source of this power." Section 1106(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code, however, may not be as expansionist as the proponents con-
tend."1
The United States Supreme Court held in CFTC v. Weintraub
that a trustee in bankruptcy has the power to waive a corporate
70. Id. at *1.
71. Id.
72. See Enron Order at 3. The waiver provisions of the Enron Order provided that the
examiner "shall have the power to waive" the attorney-client privilege on an "issue-by-issue
basis" with respect to pre-petition communications relating to matters that the examiner
was to investigate. In the Enron Order, the court further instructed that the examiner was
to act "in the best interest of the debtor's estates" in connection with any decision to waive
the attorney-client privilege, and that the debtors' and creditors' committees could make
objections to such a waiver.
73. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). The notion that an examiner is not a party-in-interest is
consistent with the fact that an examiner's role in bankruptcy is generally limited to being
a neutral and independent investigator.
74. Cf., Baldwin United Corp., 46 B.R. at 315 (holding that examiner shall have the
same privilege rights as trustee so that examiner may perform its statutorily mandated
duties).
75. In Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, the United States Supreme Court con-
cluded that "whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only
be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code." 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988).
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debtor's attorney-client privilege with respect to pre-bankruptcy
communications."6 The CFTC v. Weintraub case appears to pro-
vide practical support for conferring upon an examiner the power
to waive the attorney-client privilege.77
In Weintraub, the United States Supreme Court noted the
proposition that the trustee in bankruptcy plays the role most
closely analogous to that of a solvent corporation's management."8
The Supreme Court reasoned that conferring upon a trustee the
power to waive the privilege is consistent with the fact "that the
debtor's directors retain virtually no management powers, land, as
a resultj they should not exercise the traditional management
function of controlling the corporation's attorney-client privilege."79
The Supreme Court went on to explain,
It would be extremely difficult for the trustee to investigate
the conduct of prior management if the former management
were allowed to control the attorney-client privilege and
therefore control access to the corporation's legal files.8"
The Weintraub Court therefore held that vesting control of the
debtor corporation's attorney-client privilege in the trustee was
appropriate81 and did not in any way conflict with the careful de-
sign of the Bankruptcy Code.8"
The Supreme Court's second line of reasoning in Weintraub as-
serted that trustees need to be able to control the attorney-client
privilege in order to conduct a thorough investigation and thereby
discover "hidden assets" or "looting schemes."83 Essentially, the
Supreme Court appears to have held in this instance that wrest-
ing control of the privilege away from persons who may have en-
gaged in, or have knowledge of, tortious conduct is in the best in-
terest of creditors. In fact, some cases have suggested that the
76. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 358.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 353.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 355. Wresting control of the attorney-client privilege does
not translate into a trustee's unfettered right to waive it. As the Supreme Court in Wein-
traub noted," The propriety of the trustee's waiver of the attorney-client privilege in a par-
ticular case can, of course, be challenged in the bankruptcy court on the ground that it
violates the trustee's fiduciary duties." Id. at n.7.
82. Id. at 354.
83. Id.
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debtor or trustee has the fiduciary duty to waive the privilege in
these circumstances.84
IV. DOES AN EXAMINER REALLY HAVE STANDING TO WAIVE THE
DEBTOR'S ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE?
The fiduciary duty argument conferring standing upon an exam-
iner to waive an attorney-client privilege does have some curb ap-
peal, and perhaps some basis in Sections 105 and 1106(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code.85 This argument, however, is also prone to at-
tack.
Challenges to an examiner's power to waive the debtor's attor-
ney-client privilege may cite to the plain language of the Bank-
ruptcy Code as support for the proposition that an examiner's
power to waive privileges is illusory. Specifically, a fair reading of
the fundamental premise of the Supreme Court's decision in Wein-
traub is that the attorney-client privilege is property of the es-
tate," which a bankruptcy trustee owns and controls as a matter
84. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970). Garner is the seminal
case reflecting the fiduciary exception to retaining the attorney-client privilege. In Garner,
a number of shareholders brought a derivative suit against a corporation alleging various
counts of fraud and corporate misconduct. When the shareholders sought information and
documentation from the company's former counsel, who later became an officer of the com-
pany, both the counsel and the company claimed that the information and documentation
were protected by the privilege. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the privilege
did not apply because the corporation owed a fiduciary duty to the shareholders and the
privilege should not deny the beneficiary access to information or documentation created or
obtained, at least in part, for the shareholders' benefit. According to the Court in Garner,
courts are to consider the applicability of the attorney-client privilege in a particularized
context. In instances wherein the client asserting the privilege is an entity that in the
performance of its functions acts wholly or partly in the interests of others, and those oth-
ers or some of them seek access to the subject matter of the communications, courts are to
conclude:
The representative and the represented have a mutuality of interest in the represen-
tative's freely seeking advice when needed and putting it to use when received. This
is not to say that management does not have allowable judgment in putting advice to
use. But management judgment must stand on its merits, not behind an ironclad
veil of secrecy which under all circumstances preserves it from being questioned by
those for whom it is, at least in part, exercised.
Garner, 430 F.2d at 1101.
85. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 1106(b). Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code author-
izes the bankruptcy court to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]." See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
Certainly, the entry of an order providing an examiner with access to privileged materials,
and to waive applicable privileges, is consistent with an examiner's duty to investigate the
acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor and the operation of
the debtor's business.
86. The phrase "property of the estate" is defined in section 541 of the Bankruptcy
Code, and includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the com-
205
Duquesne Law Review
of law once he or she is appointed. 7 According to Weintraub,
management of the debtor is "ousted" by the appointment of a
trustee, and all such property of the estate then passes to the trus-
tee duly appointed by the court.88 Towards this end, Weintraub
may be construed narrowly and be applicable only in contexts of
bankruptcy trustees (who have vast powers) as opposed to bank-
ruptcy examiners (whose powers are limited).
The Bankruptcy Code is consistent with a narrow application of
Weintraub. Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a
bankruptcy trustee to sell, use or lease property of the bankruptcy
estate both in the ordinary course of business, and (subject to prior
order of the court) outside the ordinary course of business.89 Ar-
guably, the waiver of the attorney-client privilege is a "use" of
property of the estate as contemplated in Section 363(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code.9" As a result, it is important to note that Sec-
tion 363 of the Bankruptcy Code permits no one, other than the
debtor or trustee, to use, sell, or lease property of the estate.9'
Consequently, to the extent that the waiver of the attorney-client
privilege constitutes a "use" of "property of the estate," the Bank-
ruptcy Code does not appear to authorize or empower an examiner
to waive the privilege.9"
The legal concept of "property of the bankruptcy estate" is quite
broad, and, pursuant to Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, in-
cludes all legal and equitable interests of the debtor as of the
commencement of the bankruptcy case.9" The question of whether
the debtor's attorney-client privilege constitutes property of the
debtor's bankruptcy estate is an issue that has been confounding
mencement of the case" and any such interest acquired "after the commencement of the
case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
87. See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 349-353.
88. Id. at 352-353 (citing Bankruptcy Code Sections 323, 541, 363, 704 and 1106).
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
90. The Weintraub opinion suggests that creditors may object to the waiver of any
estate privileges. See supra note 81. Implicit in such a conclusion is that the waiver is a
non-ordinary course transaction for which creditors and other parties in interest are enti-
tled to notice and an opportunity to be heard.
91. Id. The United States Supreme Court has held that when the "statute's language is
plain, the sole function of courts is to enforce it according to its terms." United States v.
Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).
92. See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1
(2000)(holding that only the trustee or debtor-in-possession may assert Section 506(c) sur-
charge claims because Section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code does not repose the authority
of prosecuting such claims in third-parties).
93. See 11 U.S.C. Section 541.
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legal scholars for many years." Some commentators suggest that
characterizing the attorney-client privilege as alienable property
is "morally repugnant" since the privilege is personal in nature.95
Authority exists in support of the proposition that the right to
invoke the attorney-client privilege is both transferable and has
some indicia of property. For example, in Swidler & Berlin and
James Hamilton v. United States,9" the United States Supreme
Court held that as a matter of federal common law the attorney-
client privilege survives the death of its holder for the benefit of
the holder's estate.97 Similarly, in the commercial context, some
courts have acknowledged that the attorney-client privilege can be
transferred along with the debtor's personal property." In the
corporate context, the United States Supreme Court in Weintraub
even appears to implicitly embrace the concept that the attorney-
client privilege constitutes a legal and/or equitable property inter-
est of a debtor in bankruptcy.99
Critics of the "privilege as property" theory contend that con-
struing the attorney-client privilege as a legal or equitable inter-
est of the debtor falling within the ambit of Section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code is "unsound." °° Undoubtedly, the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege "is to encourage full and frank communi-
cation between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
94. For an outstanding discussion of the issue, see Laura B. Bartell, The Implied
Waiver Solution to the Problem of Privileges in the Individual Bankruptcy Case, 20 BANKR.
DEV. J. 25 (2003) and Neil E. Herman, Who Controls the Attorney-Client Privilege in Bank-
ruptcy, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 549 (1985).
95. Bartell, The Implied Waiver Solution to the Problem of Privileges in the Individual
Bankruptcy Case, 20 BANKR. DEV. J. at 42 n 97.
96. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
97. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 404-405.
98. See, e.g., American Metrocomm Corp. et al. v. Duane Morris & Heckscher (In re
American Metrocomm Corp., 274 B.R. 641, 654 n.10 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002)(where assignee
of litigation claims also acquired shared privilege rights); Grace Children's Prods, Inc. v.
Regalo Intl LLC, Civ. A. 97-6885, 1999 WL 553478 at *3, 4 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 1999)(holding
that the right to assert or waive the attorney-client privilege also passes with the majority
of a corporation's assets in an asset sale); Rhode Island Depositors Ecocomic Protection
Corp. v. Mapleroot Dev. Corp., 710 A.2d 167 (R.I. 1998)(stating that "DEPCO expressly
purchased all of the receiver's personal and intangible rights with respect to this borrower.
Such rights would include the receiver's right to assert any attorney client privilege that
formerly belonged to [the borrower]"); In re Amjoe, Bankr. L.Rep. (CCH) P 66, 131 (M.D.
Fla. 1976)(suggesting that the attorney-client privilege is connected to other property of the
estate, and if that other property passes to the trustee, the attorney-client privilege should
pass with it); contra In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 89-3 & 89-4, 734 F.Supp. 1207, 1211 n.3
(E.D. Va.), affd in part, vacated in part, 902 F.2d 244 (4" Cir. 1990).
99. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348-351.
100. See, e.g. Herman, Who Controls the Attorney-Client Privilege in Bankruptcy, 13
HOFSTRA L. REV. at 583.
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broader public interests in the observance of law and administra-
tion of justice."' Critics contend that if the attorney-client privi-
lege is construed as a property interest passing to a bankruptcy
trustee automatically upon the commencement of a Chapter 7
bankruptcy case or upon the appointment of a trustee in a Chap-
ter 11 case, such a construction will have a chilling effect upon the
attorney-client relationship.' According to such critics, the chill-
ing effect is predictable because any "rational individual would not
divulge sensitive information to an attorney who might be forced
to reveal the information if the individual suffers a financial re-
versal.""1 '
The arguments of the critics of the "privilege as property" theory
appear to be misplaced to a certain degree. With respect to the
corporate context, the Weintraub decision (which indirectly
adopted the "privilege as property" theory) is nearly twenty years
old, and corporate entities still seek out and obtain corporate
counsel just as they did prior to that decision. Irrespective of the
Weintraub decision, corporate decision makers outside of a bank-
ruptcy context have always been subject to the risk that successor
managers of the corporation's affairs would waive the attorney-
client privilege to the extent that such a waiver is either in the
corporation's best interest or is consistent with the fiduciary du-
ties of the corporation's officers and directors. Under these cir-
cumstances, the Weintraub decision and the concept of "privilege
as property" has no chilling effect on the attorney-client privilege
in the corporate context. As a matter of fact, the Weintraub deci-
sion and the privilege as property theory merely restate the obvi-
ous (i.e. -- that corporate entities are inanimate objects whose then
current managers control the invocation and waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege).
With respect to the individual debtor context, critics of the
"privilege as property" approach contend that characterizing the
attorney-client privilege as a property interest has "untoward con-
sequences." 4 Citing to the fact that the fiduciary duties of a
bankruptcy trustee flow to creditors, and not to the interests of the
individual debtor,0° critics argue that a bankruptcy trustee "will
101. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S., 389 (1981).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Bartell, The Implied Waiver Solution to the Problem of Privilege in the Individual




not, and should not act in the best interests of the debtor in decid-
ing whether to waive the privilege, but will pursue his [or her]
statutory obligations to collect property of the estate and investi-
gate the financial affairs of the debtor."' °6 Consequently, an unto-
ward corollary highlighted by critics of the "privilege as property"
theory is the fact that individual debtors' pre-bankruptcy commu-
nications subsequently may operate to open a Pandora's Box of
criminal and/or civil liability to the detriment of the unsuspecting
debtor. °7
It can be argued that the critics' fears of the "privilege as prop-
erty" theory in the individual debtor context also are somewhat
misguided. As an initial matter, the attorney-client privilege is
not without exception, as the law of virtually every jurisdictions
will not allow clients and lawyers to communicate with impunity
about future crimes or intentional torts such as fraud.' Even
outside of bankruptcy, an individual consumer debtor may find his
or her privilege impliedly waived if the circumstances fall within
the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.
Also, the individual debtor does have resources available to
avoid the forfeiture of the privilege. To the extent that the indi-
vidual debtor's interest in retaining the privilege is paramount to
all of his or her other interests, the debtor is always free not to
seek bankruptcy protection in the first instance and to deal with
his or her creditors in a non-bankruptcy context. To the extent
that the individual debtor is in need of a fresh start and has no
choice but to seek bankruptcy protection (or, alternatively, if the
individual debtor finds himself or herself subject to an involuntary
bankruptcy proceeding), the debtor can attempt to shield the privi-
lege, and augment his or her "fresh start" in bankruptcy, by de-
claring his or her interest in the attorney-client privilege as being
exempt from property of the estate pursuant to Section 522 of the
Bankruptcy Code.0 9
Exempting the attorney-client privilege under Section 522 of the
Bankruptcy Code from property of the estate does have practical
106. Id.
107. Id. at 49.
108. See § 82 at 613-14 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS (1998); see
e.g. In re Grand Jury Subpenas, 144 F.3d 653, 660 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 966
(1998).
109. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) (2004) (providing an individual debtor with a "wild-card"
exemption to the extent of $8,725 of an unused homestead exemption in bankruptcy); see
also 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2004) (providing that an entity holding exempt property does not
have to turnover such exempt property to the bankruptcy trustee).
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concerns. For example, how does one value the exemption to in-
sure that the statutory amount of exemptions are met? If the con-
tent of the privileged communication is not disclosed, can a court
ever determine whether the "asset" has been appropriately ex-
empted by the debtor? Surely, this result is unworkable and is
something that Congress did not contemplate when it drafted the
property of the estate provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Despite a debtor's ability to claim exemptions under Section 522
of the Bankruptcy Code, the statutory framework of the Bank-
ruptcy Code is such that debtors do not enjoy an expectation of
confidentiality where the attorney-client privilege implicates tan-
gible assets and choses of action which could be liquidated for the
benefit of creditors." The provisions of Section 521 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code impose upon the debtor the absolute duty to "cooper-
ate with the trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform
the trustee's duties" under the Bankruptcy Code.111 Such duties of
a debtor to cooperate include surrendering to the bankruptcy trus-
tee "any recorded information, including books, documents, re-
cords, and papers, relating to property of the estate.""' Based on
Section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code and the broad concept of
"property of the estate" utilized in Section 541 of the Bankruptcy
Code, it is conceivable to conclude that Congress envisioned a
scheme whereby the attorney-client privilege of an individual
debtor would submit, in appropriate situations, to the needs of the
bankruptcy trustee, so that the trustee may carry through with
his or her duties under the Bankruptcy Code.'13 In addition, the
"as necessary" language utilized in Section 521 of the Bankruptcy
Code also suggests that the bankruptcy trustee's claim to privi-
leged materials is tempered by necessity. Courts therefore should
balance the interests of the bankruptcy estate in general against
the harm caused to the individual debtor when framing an order
directing the turnover of privileged materials."4
110. It should also be recognized that the mere fact that a trustee may succeed to the
debtor's interest in the attorney-client privilege does not necessarily mean that the privi-
lege is waived. In fact, Section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code appears to preserve the privi-
lege unless expressly waived by the trustee as the Bankruptcy Code provides that the
transfer of documents and information by attorneys to the trustee is "[slubject to applicable
privileges ....." 11 U.S.C. § 542(e).
111. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(3).
112. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(4).
113. In re Miller, 247 B.R. 704, 710 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000).
114. Id. The analysis pursuant to Section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code is consistent with
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence. 501 provides that the
attorney-client privilege "shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
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No matter how the attorney-client privilege is viewed from a
bankruptcy perspective, it is important to recognize that the right
to assert or to waive privileges in and of itself is either property of
the bankruptcy estate or it is not. Authority certainly exists (most
notably the Weintraub decision) in support of the theory that a
debtor's attorney-client privilege should be construed as property
of the bankruptcy estate."5 If the privilege constitutes property of
the bankruptcy estate, Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code au-
thorizes only the debtor or trustee to sell, use, or lease such prop-
erty, and no-one else (including an examiner in bankruptcy) is au-
thorized to do so. Conversely, if the debtor's attorney-client privi-
lege does not constitute property of the bankruptcy estate, there is
absolutely nothing in the Bankruptcy Code that empowers anyone
other than the debtor to waive the privilege. Moreover, a debtor's
obligation to cooperate and turn over records flows only to a bank-
ruptcy trustee under Section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code. Under
these circumstances, waivers in favor of examiners, like the one
procured in Enron, appear to be suspect.
Additional statutory prohibitions on an examiner's power to
waive an attorney-client privilege can be found in Sections 321(b)
and 1106 of the Bankruptcy Code."6 As to the former, Section
321(b) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits an examiner from serving
as a trustee in the same bankruptcy case."7 Bankruptcy courts
have relied upon this statute to prohibit examiners from being
morphed into quasi-trustees."8
For example, in In re International Distributions Centers, Inc.,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York vacated an order of the bankruptcy court delegating the
powers and duties of a trustee to an examiner."9  The District
Court, looking at the substantive powers afforded to the examiner
in that case (as opposed to mere titles bestowed upon officers of
the court), concluded that the powers granted to the examiner at
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experi-
ence." This analysis also is consistent with Section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C.
§ 542. Section 542(a) provides that property of "inconsequential value or benefit" to the
bankruptcy estate need not be turned over to the bankruptcy trustee. See 11 U.S.C. §
542(a).
115. See also Citibank, N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1194-1196 (8" Cir. 1981).
116. See 11 U.S.C. 88 321(b) and 1106(b).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 321(b).
118. See In re Int'l Distributions Centers, Inc., 74 B.R. 221 (1977).
119. Id.
Winter 2005
issue intruded upon the powers conferred upon a trustee.120 In
vacating the bankruptcy court's order, the Court in International
Distributions Centers, Inc. held that it is an abuse of discretion to
appoint pseudo-trustees cloaked with powers of a trustee when
Section 321 of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits an examiner from
being both trustee and examiner in the same bankruptcy 
case.121
The conclusion reached in the In re International Distributions
Centers, Inc. case is supported by Section 1106 of the Bankruptcy
Code and case-law interpreting this statute. In looking at Section
1106 of the Bankruptcy Code, this section describes the powers
and duties of trustees and examiners. 122 As it relates to trustees,
Section 1106(b) sets forth both the "powers" and the "duties" of
trustees in bankruptcy. Conversely, when Section 1106 addresses
examiners, Section 1106 only imposes "duties" upon examiners
and bestows no "powers" whatsoever.' This distinction between
"powers" and duties" in Section 1106 of the Bankruptcy Code
served to deflate an examiner's efforts to prosecute certain adver-
sary proceedings in the case of In re Patton's Busy Bee Disposal
Service, Inc.. In Patton's Busy Bee, the Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of New York wrote:
... [T]he parties fail to distinguish the concepts of duty and
responsibility from the concepts of power and authority. The
existence of an obligation does not necessarily command the
use of any particular means to fulfill that obligation. For ex-
ample, the duty to safeguard an interest does not necessarily
empower the obligor to commence an action. Rather, a plain-
tiff must possess authority to employ litigation as an appro-
priate exercise of responsibility. For such creatures of this
Court as examiners and trustees, this authority must derive
from the Bankruptcy Code itself or from an order of this
Court.
The Bankruptcy Code carefully defines the responsibilities
and powers of a trustee. Section 1106(a) sets forth seven du-
ties of a trustee. Apart from this provision are grants of au-
thority contained in section 323 .... In contrast, the Code as-
signs far more limited responsibility to an examiner and con-
120. Id. at 223.
121. Id at 224.
122. 11 U.S.C. § 1106 (2004).
123. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a) with 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b).
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tains no clear authorization for the examiner's commence-
ment of an adversary proceeding.'24
The Bankruptcy Code and case law set forth above suggests
that the ability of an examiner to have its powers morphed to in-
clude powers traditionally vested solely with a bankruptcy trustee
(such as waiver of the attorney-client privilege) is far from cer-
tain.'25 Precedent and statutory provisions under the Bankruptcy
Code both support and work against affording an examiner the
power to waive the attorney-client privilege.'26 While the practical
and prudential reasons for permitting an examiner to waive the
attorney-client privilege are frequently present in most cases
(such as the trustee case in Weintraub), Congress has not yet spe-
cifically empowered examiners to waive attorney-client privileges
that constitute either property of the bankruptcy estate under
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code or records turned over to
bankruptcy trustees pursuant to Section 521 of the Bankruptcy
Code. This legal issue has been further complicated by the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Hartford Underwriters Insur-
ance Company v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., which contains a
narrow view of which persons may exercise powers traditionally
held by the debtor or trustee.
127
In Hartford Underwriters, a unanimous United States Supreme
Court reaffirmed the well-established precept of statutory con-
struction that provides that where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, "the sole function of the courts . . . is to
enforce [the statute] according to its terms."28 In Hartford Un-
derwriters, the United States Supreme Court followed this precept
of statutory construction in the context of a case in which an ad-
ministrative creditor, in its own right, sought to recover its post-
petition claim against the debtor's secured lender pursuant to the
"surcharge" provisions of Section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. 29
124. In re Patton's Busy Bee, 182 B.R. at 685-86.
125. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d
548, 578 (3d Cir. 2003).
126. Id. at 577-78 (noting that language of Section 1106 of the Bankruptcy Code has
been interpreted to afford courts with the authority to expand an examiner's power to sue,
and also noting that such a construction is suspect).
127. See Hartford Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 2.
128. Id.
129. Id. Section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code states, "The Trustee may recover from
property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of
preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holders of such
claim." 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (2004).
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Because the administrative creditor in Hartford Underwriters
pursued the surcharge claim in its own right without express con-
sent of the court, and because Section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code unambiguously provides that "[tihe trustee may" pursue
such surcharge claims, the United States Supreme Court rejected
the unilateral right of an unpaid administrative creditor to prose-
cute a surcharge claim under Section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code.13°
Hartford Underwriters' narrow view of which persons may exer-
cise powers traditionally owned by the debtor or trustee arguably
restricts the ability of a bankruptcy examiner to waive the attor-
ney-client privilege of a debtor-in-possession. It is difficult to
harmonize this narrow view espoused by Hartford Underwriters
with the fundamental purpose of the Bankruptcy Code (i.e.,
maximizing the estate and distributions to creditors) in the ab-
sence of some statutory enactment by Congress or Supreme Court
precedent that permits persons other than the debtor or trustee to
waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege in bankruptcy.'31
All may not be lost, however. In Hartford Underwriters, the
United States Supreme Court left open the issue of whether the
concept of "derivative standing" is legally cognizable in a bank-
ruptcy setting when a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession
refuses to enforce legal claims or causes of action for the benefit of
creditors.'32 While the United States Supreme Court has yet to
tackle the derivative standing issue, several Federal Courts of Ap-
peals have recently been heard on the issue and have recognized
130. See Hartford Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 2.
131. In In re Boileau, 736 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed an order that permitted an examiner to waive the debtor's attorney-client privi-
lege. Under the unique facts if the case, the Boileau Court stated, "Our holding is not to be
understood as a ruling on the authority of an examiner to waive the attorney-client privi-
lege." Id. at 506.
132. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court wrote:
We do not address whether a bankruptcy court can allow other interested parties to
act in the trustee's stead in pursuing recovery under § 506(c). Amici ... draw our at-
tention to the practice of some courts of allowing creditors or creditors' committees a
derivative right to bring avoidance actions when the trustee refuses to do so, even
though the applicable Code provisions, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 545, 547(b), 548(a), 549,
mention only the trustee. See, e.g., In re Gibson Group, Inc., 66 F.3d 1436, 1438
(C.A.6 1995). Whatever the validity of that practice, it has no analogous application
here, since petitioner did not ask the trustee to pursue payment under § 506(c) and
did not seek permission from the Bankruptcy Court to take such action in the trus-
tee's stead. Petitioner asserted an independent right to use § 506(c), which is what
we reject today.
Hartford Underwriters, 530 U.S. at 13 n. 5.
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the general equitable concept of "derivative standing""' in in-
stances where a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession
wrongfully fails to prosecute lawsuits for the benefit of creditors.""
These cases are indeed persuasive. To the extent that they are
applicable to the issue of whether an examiner's power may, on a
derivative basis, be expanded to include the ability to waive the
debtor's attorney-client privilege, these cases are also consistent
with the goals and aims of Sections 1104 and 1106 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, namely, to eliminate the proverbial problem of the
"fox guarding the henhouse.""5
Notwithstanding the apparent benefits of recognizing the con-
cept of "derivative standing" in bankruptcy, recent case law in this
area nonetheless casts some doubt on whether an examiner can
have its powers morphed into the various powers normally re-
133. Bankruptcy courts have long been recognized as courts of equity. Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). The concept of derivative
standing is consistent with the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, as deriva-
tive standing permits the beneficial owners (i.e., the creditors) of the legal claim or cause of
action to exercise such rights in the name of the party who holds a mere nominal interest
(i.e., the trustee or debtor-in-possession) in the legal claim or cause of action. See e.g., Offi-
cial Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc., 267 F.3d 340, 349
(2001)(noting that creditors are the beneficiary of claims prosecuted by trustee or debtor-in-
possession). Because the concept of derivative standing is consistent with the equitable
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, derivative standing has long been recognized in bank-
ruptcy, see e.g., Glenny v. Langdon, 98 U.S. 20, 27 (1878)(derivative standing "is founded
upon the enlarged principles of equity"); McDaniel v. Stroud, 106 F. 486, 489 (4th Cir.
1901)("the court would, in the first instance, have directed the trustee to allow the use of
his name to conduct the appeal if it was thought necessary"); In re Stern, 144 F. 956, 958
(8th Cir. 1906)("if [the trustee] refuses to oppose a claim or to move for its reconsideration
when he ought to do so, he may be compelled to act or to permit the objecting creditors to
act in his name"); Ohio Valley Bank Co. v. Mack, 163 F. 155, 156 (6th Cir. 1906)("when the
trustee refuses to appeal.., the better practice would be to order the trustee to appeal or to
allow the dissatisfied creditor to appeal in his name"); SEC v. United States Realty & Im-
provement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 457-58 (1940)(recognizing creditors derivative rights to chal-
lenge claims filed by other creditors in a Chapter XI proceeding). Such a mechanism was
not abrogated by the Bankruptcy Code. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986)(The normal rule of statutory construction is that if
Congress intends for legislation to change interpretation of a judicially created concept, it
makes that intent specific .... The Court has followed this rule with particular care in
construing the scope of bankruptcy codification.").
134. See Cybergenics, supra.; see also Commodore Intl, Ltd. v. Gould, 262 F.3d 96 (2d
Cir. 2001).
135. For example, if the debtor's insiders and professionals are permitted to hide behind
the cloud of secrecy that is attendant to the attorney-client privilege, how will an examiner
be able to complete fully his or her mandate? The answer to this hypothetical suggests that
if the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits an examiner from fulfilling his or
her duties, the result may be deemed "absurd" and the statute should be interpreted to
avoid any absurd result. Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2001)(the sole
function of the court is to enforce the statute according to its terms if the statute is plain
and does not lead to an absurd result).
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served to a bankruptcy trustee.136  Simply stated, the largest
stumbling block to this endeavor is the plain language of the
Bankruptcy Code itself. As a starting point, and as set forth
above, a preliminary problem with giving an examiner the equal
rights and powers of a trustee is the fact that the Bankruptcy
Code fails to provide an examiner with "party-in-interest"
status.1 7 As a result, the ability of an examiner to appear and be
heard on any issue in Chapter 11 may be in doubt.
An examiner's chameleon-like character is also thwarted by the
provisions of Section 1106 of the Bankruptcy Code. 38  In the con-
text of its holding that an examiner in bankruptcy lacks the power
to prosecute estate causes of action on a derivative basis, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corporation v.
Chinery wrote,
... [W]e harbor doubts about [an examiner's] ability to substi-
tute for derivative suit. One concern is that, like a trustee, an
examiner would incur direct costs through its fees, so that ex-
tent of this remedy is inferior to the alternative of derivative
suit by a creditors' committee. [139]
The more serious problem, however, is that it is less than ob-
vious that Section 1106(b) actually does permit examiners to
initiate actions on the debtor's behalf. The full text of that
section states:
An examiner appointed under section 1104(d) of this title
shall perform the duties specified in paragraphs (3) and (4) of
subsection (a) of this section, and, except to the extent that
the court orders otherwise, any other duties of the trustee
136. Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 577-78.
137. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). The fact that an examiner is not a party-in-interest in
bankruptcy is consistent with the concept that an examiner is a disinterested neutral. See
supra note 57. Because an examiner is a neutral party, arguably it is improper to afford an
examiner derivative standing, as such standing erodes the examiner's neutrality. Id.
138. See 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a) and (b) (describing the powers of trustees and only the
duties of examiners).
139. Unlike an examiner, a creditors' committee is a party-in-interest under 11 U.S.C. §
1109 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b). Some courts have relied on this
section of the Bankruptcy Code to confer standing upon creditors' committees to prosecute
various lawsuits such as preference actions and fraudulent conveyance claims when a
debtor-in-possession or Chapter 11 trustee fails to initiate the action and the claims are
shown to be colorable. See e.g., In re STN Enterprises, 779 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1985).
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that the court orders the debtor in possession not to per-
form.14
0
Although this catch-all language is expansive, it is subject to
the interpretive canon ejusdem generis, which states that
"where general words follow specific words in a statutory
enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace
only objects similar to those enumerated by the preceding
specific words." [citation omitted]. [Paragraphs] (3) and (4) [of
Section 1106(a)] allow the examiner to "investigate the acts,
conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the
debtor, the operation of the debtor's business and the desir-
ability of the continuance of such business and any other
[relevant] matter," and also to "file a statement of investiga-
tion." 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)(3)-(4). Critically, these sections
permit only investigating and reporting on that investigation,
they stop far short of authorizing examiners to litigate based
on their findings.'41
As the Third Circuit's holding in Cybergenics illustrates, an ex-
aminers' ability to have its powers expanded to encompass powers
normally reserved for trustees is indeed questionable under the
current status of the law -- both in the attorney-client privilege
waiver context and outside of it. Examiners therefore will con-
tinue to find that their powers may be legitimately questioned in
any bankruptcy context until such time the outer limits of an ex-
aminer's powers are fully and finally defined by Congress or the
United States Supreme Court. The end result is that the confu-
sion attenuated by the Bankruptcy Code and existing case law
does nothing but add to the costs of administering a bankruptcy
estate' and, in some instances, cloaks an examiner in a cloud of
uncertainty.
V. CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy examiners remain a useful alternative to the ap-
pointment of a trustee in some Chapter 11 cases. The utility of
140. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b).
141. Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 578.
142. See In re Mirant Corporation et al, Case No. 03-46590 (Bankr. N.D. Texas 2003), in
which the Bankruptcy Court appointed an examiner with expanded powers only to have
various parties-in-interest litigate and file motions for reconsideration as to whether ex-
panding the powers of an examiner is proper under the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
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examiners includes the fact that an examiner is a disinterested
officer of the court who has the unquestionable duty to investigate
the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the
debtor and the operation of the debtor's business. The utility of
examiners in bankruptcy also includes the fact that an examiner
is duty bound to submit a public report to the court for the benefit
of all creditors. It is generally recognized that the court appoint-
ment of examiners with expanded powers is an inventive, efficient,
and valuable method of identifying assets, promoting a reorgani-
zation under Chapter 11, and maximizing distributions to credi-
tors. The expandable powers bestowed upon examiners, however,
are far from unfettered, as some courts have expressly rejected the
notion of expanding an examiner's powers to include powers nor-
mally reserved for bankruptcy trustees (such as the power to
waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege). Until the outer limits
of an examiner's powers are fully and finally defined by Congress
or the United States Supreme Court, examiners will continue to
find their powers to be illusory.
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